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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALMA GLENN PRATT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 14469 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
UINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract action arising out of 
respondent's employment with the appellant school district. 
Respondent is seeking recovery of salary and benefits and 
reinstatement as a tenured teacher in the appellant's 
employ. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and the lower Court, the 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge, presiding entered judgment 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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on the Special Verdict on January 2 8, 19 76, awarding re-
spondent $18,0 70.03 in damages and further ordering that 
he be reinstated as a tenured employee of the appellant 
school district. Post-judgment motions were made and the 
matter was appealed to this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is a tenured school teacher, qualified to 
teach in the intermediate elementary grades, 5 and 6. 
(R. 107). He began his employment with the appellant in 
19 59 and taught at the Whiterocks school in the Uintah 
District until the end of the school year in the spring 
of 1973. (Tr. pp. 27, 28). 
In the fall of 19 72 the appellant determined to close 
the school at Whiterocks where respondent had been teaching 
and transfer the students to the Todd Elementary school in 
nearby Roosevelt, Utah. (Tr. pp. 29, 78). On or about 
March 23, 19 73, the Superintendent of the appellant, 
Mr. Ashel Evans, met with respondent and other teachers 
of the Whiterocks school. (Tr. p. 78). At this meeting, 
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Mr. Evans explained to the respondent and the other teachers 
that the school would be closing at the end of the school 
year and that if any of them desired to teach elsewhere 
in the district they should inform the appellant of their 
intent in writing. (Tr. p. 78). 
On or about April 1, 19 73, respondent sent a letter 
to appellant requesting a teaching position at the Todd 
Elementary School in Roosevelt. (Tr. p. 32, Ex. 1). Later, 
in late April or early May of 19 73 Superintendent Evans 
returned to the Whiterocks school to discuss the teaching 
assignment requests of the individual teachers. (Tr. pp. 
35, 79). During this second visit by Superintendent Evans, 
a conversation was held between him and respondent. (Id.). 
In this conversation Superintendent Evans expressed some 
concern to respondent regarding his ability to teach in 
the Todd School because new team-teaching methods were 
being utilized at that school. (Tr. p. 80). At this sug-
gestion by Superintendent Evans, respondent became somewhat 
incensed and told him that if the district didn't want him, 
he didn't want to work for the district. (Tr. pp. 35, 46, 
80). Superintendent Evans then asked respondent if he was 
resigning and he said that he was. (Tr. p. 80) Respondent 
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denies making the statement concerning resignation. (Tr. 
pp. 35, 36) . 
Subsequent to this second meeting, Superintendent Evans 
was under the distinct impression that respondent had re-
signed his job effective at the close of the school year. 
(Tr. p. 80). Accordingly, the appellant proceeded to fill 
the vacancy left by respondent's resignation. (Tr. p. 81). 
The resignation of respondent was not unusual, because 
other teachers at the Whiterocks school had also resigned 
rather than teach elsewhere in the District. (Tr. p. 82). 
At no time did respondent withdraw his resignation, 
nor did he apply for a new contract for the coming school 
year. (Id.). In the summer of 1973 the respondent applied 
for a teaching position with the Duchesne County School 
District. (Tr. pp. 46, 4 7). Apparently, respondent was 
not given an offer of employment by the Duchesne District 
\ 
and on August 14, 19 73, respondent sent a letter to Ap-
pellant requesting a hearing on his termination. (R. p. 145). 
A hearing was held on September 5, 19 73, and respondent ap- | 
peared, bringing witnesses who testified in his behalf. 
(Tr. p. 112-114). On September 24, 1973, respondent wrote 
I 
to the appellant and demanded reinstatement. This demand 
-4-
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was declined by appellant by letter dated September 25, 
1973. (R. p. 145). The instant action was filed on 
April 24, 1974. (R. p. 1)• 
When this action was filed it included as defendants 
the individual members of the school board. (R. p. 1-7) . 
It was later dismissed as to them. (R. p. 58). The com-
plaint initially alleged two theories, i.e. breach of con-
tract and violation of the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act. (R. p. 1-7). However, at the beginning of 
trial, respondent's counsel withdrew all claims under that 
Act. (Tr. p. 2). Respondent's counsel also stipulated 
that there had been no attempt whatsoever to comply with 
the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
(Tr. p. 2). Appellant claimed in its answer and has pre-
served throughout the record its defense of non-compliance 
by respondent with the provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. (R. p. 95; Tr. p. 149). 
The case was tried to a jury on December 10 and 11, 
1975. The sole question submitted to the jury was whether 
respondent had voluntarily resigned. In response to this 
interrogatory the jury found that he had not. (R. p. 242). 
The court held that damages were simply a matter of 
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computation and therefore fixed them as a matter of law. 
The court also ordered appellant to reinstate the respon-
dent as its employee at the same position of tenure and 
salary as he would have been had his employment not ter-
minated. (R. p. 269, 270). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM IS BARRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT, §63-30-1, ET SEQ., UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (19 53, AS AMENDED). 
Through the course of this litigation and up until the 
time of trial, respondent claimed a breach of contract and 
a violation by appellant of the provisions of the Utah 
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, §§53-51-1, et 
seq. Just prior to trial, however, respondent abandoned 
his claim against appellant for violation of the Orderly 
Termination Procedures Act, and he also stipulated on the 
record that there had been no attempt whatever to comply 
with the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The record reads as follows: 
-6-
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The Court: 
Now Mr. Lybbert, you had a matter that 
you asked Mr. Dibblee to stipulate re-
garding, and Mr. Dibblee indicated that 
he didn't see any reason why not—go 
ahead. 
Mr. Lybbert: 
I understand that the plaintiff is 
willing to stipulate that they have 
not proceeded or intended to proceed 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act and have not attempted nor have 
they complied with the notice provi-
sions of that act. 
Mr. Dibblee: 
I understand that's correct. 
Mr. Lybbert: 
No. 2: I understand from our previous 
conversation that you are not making 
any claim under the provisions of the 
Utah Orderly School Termination Pro-
cedures Act, Section 53-51-1, et seq. 
Mr. Dibblee: 
That's correct. 
(Tr. p. 2). The question before the court is thus whether 
compliance with the provisions of said Act is necessary 
in a breach of contract action. 
In the case of Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Ut.2d 291, 495 
P.2d 814 (1972), this court specifically addressed that 
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question. The Baugh case was an action for specific per-
formance on a real estate contract existing between Mr. and 
Mrs. Baugh and the City of Logan. The trial court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plain-
tiffs appealed. This Court affirmed, holding that there 
was insufficient part performance to justify granting the 
remedy of specific performance, and further holding that the 
plaintiffs1 failure to comply with the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act barred their claim for 
damages. In so holding this Court stated: 
"Finally plaintiffs contend that the trial 
court erred in its determination that Section 
63-30-13 applies to a cause of action based 
on contract. 
"Section 63-30-13 provides: 
A claim against a political sub-
division shall be forever barred 
unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety days after the cause 
of action arises, . . . 
"Section 63-30-2(5) provides: 
The word 'claim1 shall mean any r 
claim brought against a governmen-
tal entity or employees as permit- v 
ted by this act; 
"Section 63-30-5 provides: 
Immunity from suit of all govern-
mental entities is waived as to 
any contractual obligation. 
- f t -
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Since an action on a contractual obligation 
is a claim permitted under the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act, notice of such claim 
must be filed in accordance with Section 
63-30-13." 495 P.2d at 817. 
In 1975 the legislature amended Section 63-30-5 to 
provide that in actions arising out of contractual obliga-
tions, claimants needn't comply with the requirements of 
Sections 63-30-12, 13 and 19. However, said amendment did 
not become effective until May 13, 19 75, nearly a year after 
the instant action was filed, and two years after the con-
trolling facts of this case occurred. 
The Baugh case clearly holds that in contract actions 
against a governmental entity arising prior to May 13, 1975, 
the notice provisions of Section 6 3-30-13 must be complied 
with or the claim is barred. By amending Section 63-30-5, 
the legislature implicitly recognized that prior to the 
amendment the provisions of Sections 63-30-12, 13 and 19 
were applicable to claims arising out of contract. Other-
wise, the amendment of section five would have been a 
superflous act of futility and of no practical effect. 
Such intent may not be imputed to legislative actions. 
Respondent has stipulated that there was no attempt 
by him to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
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Consequently, no claim was ever filed. Actual notice of 
facts giving rise to a claim are insufficient to comply, 
a written claim must be filed. Scarborough v. Granite School 
District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah, 1975); Varoz v. Sevy, 29 Ut.2d 
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973); Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 
476 (Utah, 1975). Since the Baugh case holds that compli-
ance in a contract action is necessary, herefore, plain-
tiff's claim is barred as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING 
APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES AND REIN-
STATE RESPONDENT IN ITS EMPLOY. 
A. NO MUTUALITY OF PERFORMANCE. 
It has long been the law that when specific performance 
of a contract is requested as a remedy, it may be granted 
only if it is mutually available to both parties to the con-
tract. Furthermore, specific performance is not available 
if damages provide an adequate remedy. 
The general rule in this regard is stated in 71 Am.Jur. 
2d, Specific Performance, §166 (1973), as follows: 
[T]he rule that specific performance of contracts 
for personal services will not be granted ordin-
arily extends to cases where the party who was, 
by the terms of the contract, to render services 
is the plaintiff. Equity will not as a general 
-i n -
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rule compel the performance of an executory 
contract of services at the instance of the 
party who was to perform the services, . . . 
* * * 
Under the general rule, a court will not enter-
tain a suit for specific performance of a con-
tract in which the plaintiff's executory 
undertaking is to render personal services 
in a continuing employment or office, especi-
ally if he may quit the employment at any time. 
In accord with the foregoing general statement of the 
law is Annotation, 22 ALR 2d 508, 540, §13, (1952), where 
it is stated: 
Under the general rule a court will not enter-
tain a suit for specific performance of a 
contract in which the plaintiff's executory 
undertaking is to render personal services 
in a continuing employment or office, or to 
employ the defendant in such an employment 
or office. 
Especially is this so if the party may 
quit the employment at any time. (Emphasis 
added). 
The Utah courts have recognized and adopted the majority 
position on the law as quoted above. In Halloran-Judge Trust 
Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342 (1927), the plain-
tiff requested the court to specifically enforce a building 
management contract between a deceased party for whom it 
was acting as executor and the defendant. The lower court, 
sitting without a jury declined to enforce the contract and 
-11-
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the plaintiff appealed. Ruling on the issue of specific 
performance, this court held: 
Inasmuch as we are compelled to hold that the 
contract is merely one for services to be 
rendered, for which the compensation is ex-
pressly stated in the contract itself, we are 
of opinion it is not a case in which equitable 
relief can be granted. For instance, let us 
reverse the situation and assume that plaintiff 
had breached the contract by refusing to per-
form the service. In such case could plain-
tiff, at the instance of respondents, be 
compelled by a court of equity to specifically 
perform the service? We think not. If plain-
tiff could not be compelled defendants cannot 
be compelled. There must be mutuality or 
specific performance, ordinarily, will not be 
enforced. (Emphasis added). 
* * * 
Hence, we are of opinion if plaintiff is en-
titled to any relief it can only be obtained 
in an action at law. The present value of 
the contract is easily assertainable. The 
compensation is definitely fixed, and the 
expense incident to performing the service, 
in view of plaintiff's experience in the 
service thus far performed, can be approxi-
mately determined. As far as these features 
are concerned it appears to be a typical case 
for relief in an action at law. 258 Pac. 
at 348. 
Appellant is not unaware that the mutuality requirement 
for specific performance has fallen by the wayside where 
certain types of contracts are concerned. See, e.g. Genola 
Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930 (1938). 
However, in the area of personal service contracts such as 
-1 O -
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the one at issue here, the rule remains viable—and for 
good reason. As noted in Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 5A, 
§1204 (1951, and supplement), there are three basic reasons 
why personal service contracts are not specifically enforced: 
(1) Difficulty of enforcing the decree; (2) violation of 
constitutional guarantees against involuntary servitude; 
(3) fosters a continuing undesirable relationship between 
employer and employee. In this regard, Professor Corbin 
further notes that: 
The foregoing reasons will usually be found to 
be equally applicable as against specific en-
forcement of the promise of an employer to 
retain another in his service as to such en-
forcement against the servant or employee. . . . 
Neither of the two parties will be compelled to 
maintain the undesirable personal relations 
that performance of the contract requires. 
Id. at p. 401-402. 
The reasoning of Professor Corbin in this respect is 
persuasive. It is one thing to compel a manufacturer to 
supply widgets to a customer, while quite another to compel 
employer and employee to remain indefinitely in an undesir-
able personal association. 
As noted in the case of Greene v. Howard University, 
271 F.Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967): 
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A contract to hire a teacher may not be enforced 
by specific performance. It is not within those 
few categories of agreements that are enforce-
able in equity. It would be intolerable for 
the courts to interject themselves and to re-
quire an educational institution to hire or to 
maintain on its staff a professor or instructor 
whom it deemed undesirable and did not wish to 
employ. For the courts to impose such a re-
quirement would be an interference with the 
operation of institutions of higher learning 
contrary to established principles of law and 
to the best traditions of education. 271 
F.Supp. at 615. 
This is particularly so when damages constitute a perfectly 
adequate remedy for the plaintiff. 
In the instant case the respondent has been awarded 
a judgment for damages to the date of trial, and he appar-
ently felt that they constituted an adequate remedy to 
that point. The respondent's contract was sufficiently 
precise in its terms to enable computation of damages very 
simply. Thus it cannot be gainsaid that damages do not 
constitute an adequate remedy in this action. 
The respondent is not entitled to specific performance 
of the contract which he alleges. Not only is the contract 
one for personal services, not subject to specific perform-
ance, but the respondent has a perfectly adequate remedy 
at law for damages. It is true that respondent did not 
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claim damages past the date of trial in his complaint, 
nevertheless, he could easily have done so. As a matter 
of law, respondent1s only remedy was a legal remedy for 
damages. Specific performance will not lie. 
B. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT JUDGMENT. 
In his complaint, respondent alleges that the terms 
of his employment contract require that appellant hire him 
as a teacher in the district before consideration is given 
to hiring of non-tenured teachers. (R. 1-7). The alleged 
contract language relating to preference status in hiring 
was never received as evidence and was thus never available 
for the judge or jury to consider. (Tr. pp. 58, 114). 
The contract itself (Ex. p. 7) did not contain any terms 
relating to renewal or preference in hiring. It was thus 
the burden of respondent to come forward with competent 
evidence of the contractual terms which entitled him to 
specific performance and damages beyond the contract term. 
This respondent failed to do. He failed to show that he 
was entitled to have his contract renewed or that the con-
tractual terms mandated a renewal. In effect, respondent 
proved that a contract existed for the 1972-73 school year 
but totally failed to prove what the terms of that contract 
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were. Consequently, respondent is not entitled to either 
specific performance of said contract, or damages for breach 
which extend beyond the end of the 19 72-73 school year, i.e. 
the contract term. Respondent must prove that his contract 
would have and should have been renewed for the ensuing 
years in order to request relief from the court extending 
beyond the initial contract term. This respondent totally 
and completely failed to accomplish. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE 
ISSUE OF DAMAGES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The lower court ruled that damages in this action were 
merely a matter of computation and thus were for the court 
to decide. (Tr. p. 146, 147). Appellant excepted to the 
action of the court in this regard because respondent had 
failed to come forward with any evidence to show that he 
had made a reasonable effort to seek other remunerative 
employment and mitigate his damages. (Tr. p. 149). Thus, 
a jury question existed as to whether respondent had made 
a reasonable attempt to mitigate his damages. In other 
words, the jury should have been allowed to decide whether 
the efforts made by respondent in seeking and obtaining 
-16-
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other employment were reasonable in light of the evidence 
adduced and the reason and experience of the jury. 
The law of this state is that the plaintiff in a law-
suit has the duty to go forward and produce evidence on a 
given point sufficient to establish, prima facie, that it 
is fact. Kartchner v. Home, 1 Ut.2d 112, 262 P.2d 749 
(1953). Further, the burden of producing evidence does 
not shift to the defendant until the plaintiff has fulfilled 
his duty in this regard. Id. 
A plaintiff who is claiming damages for lost earnings 
has a duty to find other employment and mitigate his damage. 
The general rule on this point is stated in Morrison v. Perry, 
104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943), as follows: 
Every party must "exercise reasonable care and 
diligence to avoid loss or to minimize or lessen 
the resulting damage, and to the extent that his 
damages are the result of his active and unrea-
sonable enhancement thereof or are due to his 
failure to exercise such care and diligence, he 
cannot recover. 140 P.2d at 780. (Emphasis 
added). 
To the same effect are Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 78 
Utah 564, 6 P.2d 171 (1931) and Casey v. Nelson Bros. 
Constr. Co., 24 Ut.2d 14, 465 P.2d 173 (1970). See also, 
Annotation, 44 ALR 3d 629, 679, §31 (1972). 
-17-
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Mitigation of damages is a duty incumbent upon a plain-
tiff and is not in the nature of an affirmative defense. 
See Spruce Equipment Co. v. Maloney, 527 P.2d 1295 (Alaska, 
19 74). Consequently, the burden of initially coming for-
ward with evidence to show reasonable mitigation falls on 
the plaintiff. 
In the instant case respondent made no attempt what-
ever to show the efforts he made to obtain other employment 
or even if he obtained other employment. Check stubs showing 
his actual earnings since terminating with appellant were 
introduced into evidence, but nothing more was said. (Tr. 
pp. 39, 40; Exhibits 3 and 4). At the very least, respon-
dent should have been required to show that under all the 
circumstances his earnings for 19 74 and 19 75 were reasonable. 
Here no evidence was ever offered. And certainly, the docu-
ments themselves do not bespeak reasonableness. 
Respondent in this case has completely failed to meet 
his initial burden of coming forward with evidence to show 
that he used reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages. { 
Therefore, appellant was not required to present rebuttal 
evidence on mitigation because the burden had never shifted. 
i 
This being the case, the matter of damages should have been 
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submitted to the jury in accordance with appellant's re-
quested Instruction No. 8, for them to decide whether respon-
dent acted reasonably in mitigating his damages. Moreover, 
even if respondent had met his burden of showing prima facie 
mitigation of damages, the jury should have been allowed to 
hear evidence from appellant and decide the factual question 
of whether respondent's efforts were reasonable. As it is, 
respondent presented no evidence on mitigation. Thus appel-
lant was not required to present rebuttal or to cross examine 
the witnesses in this respect. Therefore, the matter should 
have been submitted to the jury with an appropriate instruc-
tion as requested by appellant. Appellant had a right to 
argue respondent's obvious failure to produce any evidence 
of mitigation. Failure of the lower court to so proceed is 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has stipulated on the record before this 
court that no attempt whatsoever was made to comply with the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The case 
was tried solely on a breach of contract theory. The law 
of this state in effect at the time respondent's claim arose 
clearly provided that respondent's failure to give notice 
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of the claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act was necessary in a breach of contract action. His 
failure to so comply bars his claim as a matter of law. 
The relief granted by the lower court in this case was 
erroneous because specific performance is not available 
as a remedy in a suit for breach of a personal services 
contract and because damages were awarded for a period beyond 
the contract term without any proof that respondent was 
entitled to be rehired or to have his contract renewed. 
Finally, the lower court erred in failing to submit 
the damage issue to the jury for them to decide whether 
respondent had acted reasonably in mitigating his damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
k^ Merlin R. Lybbert, Esq. 
£Z 
George A. /Hunt ,V-Esq. 
AttorneysMtor defendant-appellant 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 5 21-9 000 
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